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Abstract—COVID-19 causes a global epidemic infection, which
is the most severe infection disaster in human history. In the
absence of particular medication and vaccines, tracing and
isolating the source of infection is the best option to slow the
spread of the virus and reduce infection and death rates among
the population. There are three main obstacles in the process
of tracing the infection: 1) Patient’s electronic health record
is stored in a traditional centralized database that could be
stolen and tampered with the infection data, 2) The confidential
personal identity of the infected user may be revealed to a third
party or organization, 3) Existing infection tracing systems [1]
[2] do not trace infections from multiple dimensions. Either the
system is location-based or individual-based tracing. In this work,
we propose a global COVID-19 information sharing system that
utilizes the Blockchain, Smart Contract, and Bluetooth technolo-
gies. The proposed system unifies location-based and Bluetooth-
based contact tracing services into the Blockchain platform,
where the automatically executed smart contracts are deployed
so that users can get consistent and non-tamperable virus trails.
The anonymous functionality provided by the Blockchain and
Bluetooth technology protects the user’s identity privacy. With
our proposed analysis formula for estimating the probability
of infection, users can take measures to protect themselves in
advance. We also implement a prototype system to demonstrate
the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart contract, Coronavirus,
COVID-19, Bluetooth, Contact tracing, Information Sharing,
Risk notification, Human Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Until today, coronavirus has infected more than 11.5 million
people and caused nearly 530,000 deaths [3]. In particular,
the United States has become the country with the largest
number of known infections [4]. Every country has its own
privacy policy to share information about infected people. It is
challenging to share information across the world with reliable
privacy protection since different countries have their own
privacy policy to share the information of infected people.
Information sharing in a centralized manner, such as MIT,
Apple, and Google who announced their tracking solutions by
storing users’ personal data in cloud [1] [2], is highly relying
on users’ trust. Once the personal data has been uploading to
the cloud, users generally cannot control the potential abuse. If
a comprehensive data security solution is missing, the private
user data in the cloud may be hacked for any other harmful
purposes. As a global organization, the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) collaborates with the governments around
the world to share information and enhance the management
of epidemic prevention. However, WHO is losing trust from
some countries and cannot obtain sufficient support. Some
other governments may conceal, falsely report, or hinder from
reporting epidemic information. These may create a gaping
security hole for global epidemic prevention. To this end, there
is no way for individuals to share their information and protect
their data privacy simultaneously. Government departments
and organizations may access the health medical data of
all people, and go beyond the scope of their responsibility
and duty. For example, some government health departments
may locate the personal identity of infected patients, and
then enforce them in a centralized isolation shelter, resulting
in secondary infections, and restricting personal freedom.
Actually, Apple and Google will share the infected individuals’
information with health authorities [2], which means people’s
personal data privacy and human rights are being violated
without their knowledge.
Currently, there are two separate tracing systems existing:
location-based and individual-based contact tracing. Location-
based contact tracing always provides a centralized service and
records if there are infections in the given locations without the
knowledge of infection movement [5]. The individual-based
tracing systems only focus on the person-to-person contact via
Bluetooth [1] [2], and they do not have a record about where
users get infected. WHO states that the virus could survive on
materials surfaces [6] [7], so the virus has an effect on the
people daily activity environment. But the individual-based
system cannot trace and estimate the COVID-19 effect on the
given location. Our proposed system combines the location-
based and individual-based systems together for users to access
the public area infection status and lookup personal contact
tracing history at the same time. Our lab already deploys
the centralized location-based tracing system [5] and we may
merge our two systems together for a future research.
Blockchain can natively provide the decentralized service
to share the information and protect the privacy of people [8].
User information can be packaged in transactions and stored in
the blockchain in each computing node. Even if the data of one
node is manipulated, it will not affect the data’s consistency
because the manipulated data will not pass the verification by
other nodes. A smart contract is a program that runs on the
blockchain platform; it can execute instructions in a distributed
manner, and maintain output consistency. In our system, the
smart contract allows the user to check-in at each location and
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query the blockchain database for the location infection status.
Even though MIT, Apple, and Google provide virus con-
tact tracking solutions, the tracking service still brings the
following new challenges. The infection transmission factors
considered by current existing virus tracking service systems
are too simple. The virus is not only carried by the infected
person but also remains in the environment, so the user will
still be infected by the virus attached to the object surface.
Therefore, our proposed system not only records the user’s
contact history but also tracks the user’s travel trajectory.
Protecting user data privacy about his personal health infor-
mation in a public network is also very challenging. Tradi-
tional methods of hiding users’ personal information, such
as removing names, addresses, and social security numbers,
cannot fully protect user privacy. So we embedded the function
of Bluetooth randomization address in the contact tracking
service of the system. Besides, after users uploading health
data and identity information, they lose the ownership and
the ability to control the data. Apple and Google provide
anonymous services to users, but the infected patients will
be reported to the government health department [2]. We
choose the blockchain database as the storage method for the
system, combined with the address randomization function of
Bluetooth, only users can identify and verify their health data
and personal information stored in the database.
We design and propose a blockchain-based Covid-19 con-
tact information sharing and risk notification system that can
be used by the world to take preventive measures against epi-
demics. This system implements the following main functions
with smart contracts and Bluetooth embedded: (1) Users can
record their visited location information and personal contact
history to the blockchain database. (2) Users can update their
infection status. (3) The system can update location infection
status. (4) The system can notify the users that had been
exposed the infected people or infected locations before. (5)
The system can estimate the probability of being infected
for users based on his location visiting history and personal
contacting records. For example, a shopping mall can use our
system to detect if this building is infected and the daily
infection status. The customers can also query the database
to gain the mall infection record before their shopping. The
status of an individual is written to the blockchain and cannot
be changed.
Our system is able to protect privacy. We consider a variety
of privacy that can be protected by our system. Users can
regularly change their cellphone Bluetooth mac addresses and
encode these addresses to virtual IDs. Then, it is hard to trace
individual identity from their public information written in
the blockchain. Our system will not trace personal identity
or report personal health information to authorities.
We have the following contributions.
• We propose a hierarchical smart contract group in this
system, to manage the infection status of each location
and transportation. This design reduces the average oper-
ation cost and request processing time in the system.
• We build and merge location-based and individual person
based virus contact tracing and notification system, which
tracks the virus infection activity from higher dimensions.
• We embed a blockchain database in the system to ensure
the safety of users’ data and this design avoids the
problem that health information may be tampered and
stolen in a centralized database.
• Our system uses a weak random Bluetooth address design
to generate the user’s identity information. This design
not only protects the user’s privacy but also reduces the
congestion of data transmission within the blockchain
network.
• We propose a mathematical formula for the possibility of
user infection, which quantifies the user’s contact history
and traveling history from multiple dimensions and thus
provides a basis for the system’s notification service.
• We propose an optimal equation for the operating costs
of the system, simulate person-to-person contact and user
check-in activities in our system, and evaluate the system
performance based on the different quantity of users and
smart contracts.
Roadmap: This paper is organized as the following sec-
tions: Section II presents the system overview and system
components. Section III formulize challenging problems for
our system. Section IV describes the system design from the
perspective of four layers. Section V shows how we simulate
and evaluate system performance. The last two sections VI
and VII present the related work in smart contract tracing and
conclusion for this paper.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Our system can track the locations visited by users and the
personal contact history of users with others. When a user
updates himself infected, our system will notify other users
who have been in direct or indirect contact with him, and
provide an assessment of the probability of infection.
A. Tracing User Visited Locations
In a general scenario, the user may visit many public places,
such as offices, restaurants, shopping centers, or gyms in one
day, so he can use the designed contact tracing service to
upload his visiting records including the time and location to
our system. Then, our system will store the visiting records in
decentralized blockchain databases. Also, users can check the
infection status of a certain location before his visit to ensure
safety.
When a user reports that his infected status, a smart contract
group embedded in our system will update the virus infection
status of the locations and transportation that the user visited
and took based on his visiting records.
Our system helps users to track the history of their indirect
contact with others because the virus can land on the surfaces
of the objects and continue to remain active [9], and even if
the user does not have face-to-face contact with an infected
patient, there is still a possibility of being infected after he
touches the surface of the virus-contaminated object.
B. Tracing Person to Person Contact
Our system uses the Bluetooth functionality in users’ mobile
devices to automatically detect the others and then upload
their contact records to decentralized blockchain databases.
The range of Bluetooth detection is relatively small, which is
about 5 to 10 meters [10]. So, when the user’s mobile phone
detects the Bluetooth signals, it indicates that there are people
nearby.
When a user reports himself as infected status, our system
will broadcast his infection status and alert other users to check
if they have close contact with this infected user.
It is important to trace the direct contact recorded by
Bluetooth because viruses can attach to water vapor and spread
through the airborne [11], and users may be infected by
other people in a close range [12]. Therefore, uploading users
contact history records will help them to track the infection
transmission path of the virus and assess users’ probability of
being infected.
C. Health Tracing Service for Analysis and Notification
Our proposed system provides users with this integrated
mobile service, which contains the following functionalities:
• Location and transportation check-in
• Bluetooth signals detection and collection
• Self-infection status update
• Query about the infection status of visited places
• Notification of infection contact
• Estimation of infection probability
In the previous sections, we have outlined the first four
functions, so we focus on the health tracing service, showing
that how the possibility of infection function is estimated and
the notification function works for users.
Probability of infection: According to the manual for
WTO medical staff [13] [6], healthy people could be infected
directly and indirectly, where the direct factor is person-to-
person contact in a close distance and the indirect factor is that
the virus surviving on the surface of the object spread by the
patient infects the healthy people after they touch the surface.
So the system will evaluate the user’s risk from these factors
based on the feature data extracted from location tracing and
person-to-person contact tracing, like, the length of contact
time between users, the spatial distance between users, and
the materials of objects in public places.
Notification of infection: After the estimation of infection
probability for this user, the notification function sends a
warning alert to him, which reminds him to prepare for
virus infection in advance or to seek medical help, before
his health condition gets worse. Another scenario is when a
user reports his infected status, our system will broadcast his
virtual identity to other users. Then, these users who receive
the notification will query the local database to see if he has
had any direct or indirect contact with the infected patient and
calculate the infection probability.
D. Security and Privacy
In our system, three main technologies guarantee data
security and personal privacy: decentralized database in the
blockchain, automatic execution of smart contracts, and ran-
domization of Bluetooth mac addresses.
(a) Data Security: Our design guarantees that user data will
not be manipulated. The blockchain protocol stipulates that the
current block will always use the hash value generated from
the previous block, so if an attacker manipulates a transaction
in a block, he must tamper with all the previous blocks data
to ensure his tampering, before the next new block to be
mined, verified and accepted by other users. This computing
workload is extremely large, so it is almost impossible for an
attacker to forcibly manipulate the blockchain data. Moreover,
users in the network can detect violations of smart contracts,
and such attempts to violate the contract are verified to be
invalid and those malicious transactions will not be stored in
the blockchain.
Our system contains a smart contract group to handle all
user check-in requests for public locations and transportation.
Since smart contracts have the properties of being unmodifi-
able, requiring no supervision, and being automatically exe-
cuted, smart contracts with distributed features ensure that user
data cannot be tampered with, or produce malicious results.
So, this design ensures the security of user data.
Decentralized blockchain databases and smart contracts also
enhance the usability of our system. Since no individual or
centralized entity can control all data, there will be no smart
contract or system crash due to malicious operations done by
some users.
(b) Identity Privacy: We use Bluetooth technology to pro-
tect user data privacy. The mac addresses uploaded by users are
randomly generated by the Bluetooth protocol [14]. Although
these addresses are stored in the blockchain database, each
user’s mac address is random and is not fixedly bound to the
mobile device. It guarantees that users will not be tracked
and located by the addresses provided in the network. From
another perspective, Bluetooth technology frequently replaces
the user’s mac address [15], which means a user will gradually
use multiple different mac addresses in a unit of time. Other
people in the surroundings have no way to associate the
mac address to this user through investigation. The frequent
randomized mac address protects the user’s privacy in real life.
In order to reduce the operating overhead and internet
congestion at the system level, we choose weak randomized
generation of Bluetooth mac address. Users upload their
random mac addresses to the system, which is measured by
Ethereum gas [8] in the system overheads. The larger quantity
of random mac addresses, the better privacy protection users
could have. But the larger quantity will lead to higher operat-
ing costs and network congestion. Therefore, we need to find
a balance between a sufficiently large quantity of Bluetooth
random addresses for privacy protection, and a relatively small
quantity for lower system operating cost.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We highlight four problems: latency, throughput, operating
cost, and probability estimation for our proposed COVID-
19 information sharing and risk notification system and these
problems are described by mathematical formulas at a high-
level.
A. Latency Minimization
In our system, latency is a time difference ∆t about how
long the user’s latest check-in request can be processed com-
pletely by smart contracts and stored in the databases. We
consider that latency is affected by the following five factors:
1. the number of users |U| in the system, 2. the frequency
Freq of users sending requests, 3. the size of one block
|B|, 4. the height of the smart contract group SCG.height,
and 5. the length of the waiting queue |Queue| of the smart
contract. U includes not only users already exist in the system,
but also new users who enter the system within a unit time.
The total number of users and the frequency Freq of user’s
check-in determine the total number of user requests per unit
time in the system. If the number of user check-in requests
exceeds the processing capacity of the smart contract per
unit time, the user’s requests will enter the waiting queue
of the smart contract, which increases the request processing
time. We introduce the variable of block size |B|, because
it is one of the bottlenecks of the blockchain’s development
towards high throughput and low latency [16]. The height of
the smart contract group SCG.height and the length of the
queue |Queue| in each contract are also important factors that
affect latency. In our proposed hierarchical structure, the smart
contracts at the same level will not affect the efficiency of
processing requests between each other. The requests received
by the smart contracts at the current level are all from the
higher-level smart contracts, so the hierarchical structure we
propose is a tree structure, whose height is described as
lg(|SCG|). As mentioned before, the smart contract will put
the requests that have not been processed in time in the waiting
queue. If the number of unprocessed requests is greater than
the length of the queue, these requests will be abandoned.
Then the smart contract needs to wait for other nodes to
synchronize the transaction operations and data. This brings a
longer latency. We thus establish the latency formula:
Latency = {|U|, Freq, |B|, SCG.height, |Queue|,
δU,F, δ|B|, δSCG.height,|Queue|, φ} (1)
where we have a series of transition functions δs
provided to determine the latency, latency =
φ(δU,Freq, δ|B|, δSCG.height,|Queue|). We propose that the
three polynomial δs are combined by function φ.
B. Throughput Maximization
In our system, throughput TP refers to the number of user
requests that the system can completely handle in a unit
time. It can intuitively show the system’s ability to process
user requests. The greater the throughput, the stronger the
processing capacity of the system. Throughput is limited by
latency, packet loss rate RatePL and bandwidth BW. As
described in the previous section, five factors in the system
can affect the latency, but the RatePL and BW depends on the
network conditions at the user end. Therefore, the throughput
can be defined as follows:
TP = {latency, RatePL, BW, θ} (2)
where θ is the transition function with three arguments to
determine the TP.
C. Minimum Operating Cost Optimization
Operating cost is another important problem we consider.
Reasonable operating costs determine that our system can
serve users stably, and support its operation for a long time.
The operating cost in the system is measured by the
Ethereum gas [8], which includes the following five influ-
encing factors: location-based and Bluetooth-based contact
tracing services, Health tracing service, the setup and oper-
ation of smart contracts. We will explain all these services
and components in the next section. Since the blockchain
decentralized structure, users can query their local blockchain
database without consuming gas and we do not include the
cost of the database in the operating cost calculation. We
consider the number of users and requests have a polynomial
relationship with the cost of three tracing services. The setup
cost of a smart contract is fixed, but its operating costs will
increase with the increase of users. So we have the following
cost formula:
Cost = {Loc, Bt, Heal, Setup, Op, λ} (3)
where Loc represents location-based contact tracing service,
Bt represents Bluetooth-based contact tracing service, Heal
represents health tracing service, and Op represents all the
operations in the smart contracts like adding a user check-
in and getting a location infection status. We define λ to be
the transition function to calculate the cost combined by the
four factors.
Then, we measure the average and variance values of the
operating cost, which represent the system’s stability in an
optimal condition. Here are the formulas when the system has
five factors at minimal cost:
argsvar = argmin var(λ(Loc, Bt, Heal, Setup, Op)) (4)
argsavg = argmin avg(λ(Loc, Bt, Heal, Setup, Op)) (5)
Therefore, we can provide the optimal arguments with a
minimal system cost, which is shown as:
argsoptimal = minCost(argsvar, argsavg, ζ) (6)
where we introduce penalty function ζ to adjust five arguments
and get the global optimal sets for the cost calculation.
D. Maximum likelihood Infection Estimation
In the previous section, we briefly describe the functionality
of estimating the infection probability in the health tracing
service. Since the ground truth data contains only binary values
representing infected or not, without a percentage value for the
probability of infection, we introduce the statistical logistic
regression analysis method with iteratively reweighted least
squares (IRLS) [17] to maximum likelihood estimation and
find the optimal arguments.
We assume that the data set is relatively clean and there are
no outstanding outliers. Ground truth dataset contains n user
data points (xi, yi), i = 1, ..., n, where xi is the independent
variable tuple with (RSSI, ∆tB, ∆tC and ms) and yi is the
dependent variable with binary values {0, 1}. We conclude
five elements in the tuple affecting the infection probability:
• RSSI is the received (Bluetooth) signal strength index,
which represents the distance between users [18].
• ∆tB is Bluetooth contact time interval, which indicates
how long users detect each other’s Bluetooth signal from
a short distance.
• ∆tC is a overlapping time calculated based on two check-
in time points ti and tj, which infers the time when two
users enter the location, and ∆tC = |ti - tj|.
• ms is a discrete value in set MS representing a virus
residual active time period on a material surface [9].
So we have:
P(infection) = {RSSI, ∆tB, ∆tC, ms, β} (7)
where β is the set of parameters {β0, β1, ..., β4} for these
five arguments including the constant. Then, we can use the
estimation method IRLS to get the fitted model and arguments:
argsoptimal[w] = IRLS(X, Y, w, µ) (8)
where w is arguments tuple (RSSI, ∆tB, ∆tC, ms) and µ is the
predicated value from formula (7).
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we will define and explain our system com-
ponents from the perspective of the four layers in the system,
and the interactions within the contact tracing mechanisms.
A. System Architecture
Our trace and notification system contains four layers for
users to trace person-to-person contact via Bluetooth, check-in
locations, and lookup infection status with other users on the
blockchain platform. Fig. 1 shows four layers: User Interaction
Layer, Mobile Service Layer, Smart Contract Service Layer,
and Data Storage Layer. This system provides two primary
services for trace and notification: Bluetooth-based personal
contact trace service and location-based contact trace service.
Both of the two services are developed on the blockchain
platform, and the data generated from these two services is
stored in the distributed blockchain databases. The location-
based contact trace is coordinated by the smart contracts in the
third layer and the Bluetooth-based contact trace is handled in
the second layer.
Fig. 1: Blockchain enabled COVID-19 Trace and Notification
Architecture.
(a) User Interaction Layer
At the user interaction layer, we have two entities: user U
and location L. Users are people who hold Bluetooth-enabled
mobile phones and have two health statue types: healthy users
Unormal and infected users Uinfected. Users access to Mobile
Service in the second layer and update their health status in the
system based on their medical reports. We assume that users
always honestly upload their infection status to our system.
A location L is a public place or transportation that users
often visit in their daily lives, such as office, restaurant,
stadium, bus, and even airplane. Location L also has two
status types, uninfected location Lnormal and infected location
Linfected. If an infected user Uinfected visited this location,
then this location L would be marked as Linfected by the
system.
(b) Mobile Service Layer
Mobile Service Layer is the the core handler in our system
and it interacts directly with the other three layers.
Mobile Service MS is our proposed mobile phone application
in this layer. Cooperating with other layers, the Mobile Service
layer is an interface layer for providing users with services,
including the following two aspects: contact tracing service
based on Bluetooth or location, and health tracing service
supported by data provided from the blockchain database.
Contact tracing services include location-based and
Bluetooth-based, focusing on indirect and direct contact be-
tween users. The Bluetooth-based service is an integral part
of the client’s mobile phone service which embeds the Blue-
tooth function. It can sniff other surrounding users’ Bluetooth
devices, and broadcast its own Bluetooth random mac address
MacAddr as a virtual identity. This Bluetooth-based service can
exchange its user randomized mac address with other users via
Bluetooth, and then packet received other users’ mac addresses
MacAddrs, time interval TimeInterval of the interaction and
received signal strength index RSSI into the transaction Tx,
which is broadcast to the blockchain network. In addition,
when the user receives other’s infection notification from the
broadcast transaction Tx, our mobile APP will automatically
query the local blockchain database for the infected user’s
Bluetooth address, check-in information, and check whether
the infected user has a direct or indirect contact with current
user.
The second contact tracing service is the location-based
tracing. It accepts the user check-in requests Reqcheckins from
the User Interaction Layer and it coordinates these requests
to different smart contracts in the third layer based on the
sender’s location. At the same time, the infection status of this
location L is affected by the user’s check-in request Reqcheckin.
If the user U updates the health status as infected Uinfected
and broadcasts it to the smart contract, the location L will
be marked as infected Linfected by this corresponding smart
contract. These two services will be explained step by step in
detail and described in mathematical formulas in the next two
sections.
Health tracing service is the third sub-service in Mobile
Service Layer. This service has two functions: 1. Broadcast
user’s infected status Uinfected to alert other users and update
the infected status for the locations Ls where the infected user
visited. 2. Estimate the probability of being infected for users
ProbU(Infection).
Users Us at the first layer can update their health status
through this service at the second layer, packet their health
status {Unormal, Uinfected} in a transaction Tx and send it to
the smart contract responsible for the infection status at the
third layer and broadcast it to other users on the network. Once
the health status of the infected person has been updated as
Uinfected, people who had contact with the infected person
will be prompted with a warning alert provided by this health
tracing service.
After the normal user Unormal receives the warning alert,
this health tracking service estimates the probability of the user
being infected ProbU(Infection), based on the data collected
from location-based and Bluetooth-based tracing services con-
tact regarding the infected person Uinfected. We consider there
is a relationship between received (Bluetooth) signal strength
index RSSI and infection probability P (infection) with
COVID-19. Similar to Apple and Google’s design [2], we use
the Bluetooth sniff to detect if two users are in a close distance
D, which can be measured by the Received Signal Strength
Indication (RSSI) of Bluetooth [18] and the author uses Low
Pass Filter (LPF ) to reduce the errors in the measurement
data. To describe the content of the article without repeating,
we only quote the method based on the Bluetooth signal
strength index. In the following section, we will use the
simplified Mathematical formulas including LPF by default
to reduce errors in measured data as designed. Research and
experiments made by MIT show the COVID-19 can spread by
airbone [11], which can reach 26 feet away by a sneeze [12].
So, the closer the user is to the infected person, the easier
he is to be exposed to more viruses and become easier to be
infected. Therefore, we correlate the strength of the Bluetooth
signal strength with the possibility of being infected by a virus.
(c) Smart Contract Service Layer
The smart contract service layer is the secondary core of
our system. The check-in request Reqcheckin generated by the
user’s visiting location L is processed by the Mobile Service
Layer and forwarded to this Smart Contract Service Layer,
where it is managed by the smart contract group.
The smart contract group integrates the contracts according
to the administrative hierarchy system. The top level is the
smart contract at the state level Contractstate, followed by
the county Contractcounty, then the city Contractcity, and
finally the smallest unit location Contractlocation. Location
smart contracts Contractlocation belong to the city-level
contracts Contractcity to manage, city-level contracts belong
to counties Contractcounty, and county-level contracts belong
to states Contractstate. Each contract will only inherit from
one superior contract, and will not belong to two different
superior contracts at the same time.
Each location must be in one of these three states:
{EmptyStatus, InfectedStatus, CleanStatus}, and the
corresponding smart contract Contractlocation dynamically
records the infection status of the location L. If an infected
user Uinfected visits this location L, or a user who has visited
this location, reports that he is infected, then this location L
is considered infected by this user Uinfected. Only after the
location is cleaned, or 14 days after being infected, the location
L is considered to be in a CleanStatus.
In order to save the operating cost of the smart contract
Contractlocation and maintain the accuracy of the location
L status record, the coming requests Reqs trigger the smart
contract Contractlocation to check and update the infec-
tion status for the location L, otherwise the smart contract
Contractlocation will not actively check the infection status
of the location L. This design ensures that users can get the
latest location status for their requests while avoiding the
operations of the smart contract.
(d) Data Storage Layer
We have deployed a distributed blockchain database DB in the
data storage layer, and every user and computing node can be
synchronized in our network to get a complete database, which
is consistent with the data of others. From the perspective
of data storage, the traditional centralized database stores
all data [19] in one data center; the traditional distributed
database stores data in multiple data centers, but each center
may not have global complete data [20]. From the data
management perspective, traditional databases require a central
node to process read and write requests to the database, but a
blockchain database does not require a central node to process
read and write requests [21] [22] because all users can have the
same database locally, to directly query for consistent results.
In our system, the blockchain database will store all trans-
actions in the network, including users’ Bluetooth contact
records, check-in information of the visited locations, and
the change of the user’s public health status. The three trac-
ing services mentioned above, location-based contact tracing,
Bluetooth-based contact tracing, and health tracing services,
except location-based contact tracing requiring smart contracts
to update and store infection status to the database, in the other
two services, users can query the blockchain database directly
for personal contacts and visiting records.
Current Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain database design
Fig. 2: Location-based Contact Tracing State Machine.
have problems such as high computational cost, and slow
writing and querying data [22], but there are existing third-
generation blockchain databases now whose performance,
such as throughput, can be comparable to databases of VISA
credit card companies [23] [24]. Since the third-generation
blockchain database has no mature commercial development
and lacks a mature platform to support the development of
smart contracts, we still deploy our system on the Ethereum
platform for simulation and evaluation.
B. Location-based Contact Tracing
In this section, we describe the location-based contact
tracing service in detail: first, we show entities participating in
the service, such as users, smart contracts, and locations; and
then, we introduce the interaction activities between entities,
including user’s check-in a place while his visiting and the
user’s query of the infection status of a place before visiting.
As defined in previous sections, we have location L, which
represents a public place or transportation, users U with
normal and infected status and smart contracts, who are in
a hierarchy structure to process all users’ check-in requests.
In Figure 2, we illustrate location-based contact tracing
service with a simplified state machine.
{Q, δ, InitialState, CleanStatus} (9)
where we have
• Q = {EmptyStatus, InfectedStatus, CleanStatus}
• δ = {GenerateContract, NormalUserCheckin,
InfectedUserCheckin, InfectedUserUpdate,
LocationisCleaned, Wait14Days}
• InitialState is the Null state before the smart contract
exists
• CleanStatus is the accepting state
First, when a user issues a check-in request Reqcheckin through
the location-based contact service at the second layer, the sys-
tem checks whether there is a smart contract Contractlocation
corresponding to this location at the third layer. If the contract
does not exist, the smart contract of the city Contractcity
where the location is located will create a smart contract
Contractlocation for the location. If the contract already
exists, the system goes to the next step to process the user’s
check-in request. In case the coming user is infected, this
location enters the next state InfectedStatus, otherwise, it
enters the CleanStatus. Then, when the location is in a state
InfectedStatus, either after 14 days or if it can be cleaned
and disinfected, this location can transform to CleanStatus.
Finally, in the state CleanStatus, this location is affected
Fig. 3: Location-based Contact Tracing: User checks in the
site and stores the record in the blockchain database.
by the request of the next user. If the next user is infected
Uinfected, or his past visit is updated to be infected, then this
location will return to the previous state InfectedStatus.
Otherwise, it remains in the current CleanStatus.
Fig. 3 is an example of user U checking in a building in
location-based contact tracing service. The check-in informa-
tion about this user visiting the building, like timestamp T, geo-
graphic position GeoPos and health status {Unormal, Uinfected},
is packaged in a transaction Tx with the help of our proposed
mobile client app in the second layer. Then, the app sends the
transaction Tx to the smart contract group in the third layer.
According to the address of the building GeoPos, this trans-
action Tx is passed from the state-level Contractstate to the
county-level Contractcounty, to the city-level Contractcity,
and finally transferred to the smart contract Contractlocation
corresponding to this building. Then, based on the health
status Uinfected for example, provided by the user, the location
smart contract changes the infection status to Linfected for the
building. In this process, the transaction Tx that records the
user’s check-in information will be saved by the blockchain
database DB.
Also, the location-based contact tracing service can help
the user to get the infection status record of the location
L. We need to discuss two scenarios based on whether the
user has the Contractlocation network address locally corre-
sponding to the building for example. If the user has checked
in this location before or has previously queried the smart
contract of this location, the corresponding Contractlocation
address should exist in his mobile APP. Therefore, the user
can directly send a request to the Contractlocation network
address through the mobile APP to get the location infection
status. If the user is interacting with this location for the
first time, then he needs to get the contract network address
first. With the provided the geographic position GeoPos of
this location, the user’s mobile APP will query the state-
level Contractstate in the smart contract group, who will
transfer this query request from the top level to the city-level
Contractcity based on the provided GeoPos. If there is a
corresponding Contractlocation for this location, the network
address of this contract will be returned to the user. Otherwise,
the city-level smart contract Contractcity will create a new
Contractlocation, and its address will be returned to the user.
After receiving the location infection records from Smart
Contract Service Layer, the request sender can verify the
response by querying his local blockchain database for the
Fig. 4: Bluetooth-based Person-to-Person Contact Tracing.
transaction record. If the infection exists in this location
Linfected, our proposed mobile APP will alert the user.
To encourage users to use mobile services more frequently,
we have developed a check-in and query incentive mechanism
for users. Whenever a user checks in a location or queries the
corresponding location smart contract, this smart contract will
return a slightly more amount of transaction fee to encourage
the user to check-in or query more often. The additional fee
given to the user is to support the user to use mobile services
to broadcast his transaction that contains the Bluetooth contact
data, check-in information, and update health status.
C. Bluetooth-based Contact Tracing
Bluetooth-based contact tracing involves all entities except
the smart contract group and all layers except Smart Contract
Service Layer. The mobile APP on the second layer packs the
Bluetooth contact data in the transactions, broadcasts them
on the blockchain network, and saves all of them in the
blockchain database. Similarly, the mobile APP processes real-
time transactions received about the senders’ health status,
matches user contact records and reminds users of the danger
of contact with infected persons. In the transaction, we will
record four elements: a period of users detecting each other
∆tB, the detected mac addresses MacAddress, mobile phone
model AppleInc for example, and the received signal strength
index RSSI.
Fig.1 overviews the workflow of Bluetooth-based contact
tracing. It helps users from the first layer to exchange ran-
domized mac addresses with each other, and then packet the
data with a timestamp and received (Bluetooth) signal strength
index RSSI in the transaction, which is sent to the blockchain
database in the Data Storage Layer. The signal strength of
different Bluetooth devices will be different, so we assume
that users are using the same type of Apple mobile phone,
which provides assumption conditions for the next section
to calculate the distance between two users through signal
strength. Except that, this Bluetooth-based service will alert
users when receiving transactions containing infected health
status from another user.
Fig. 4 shows that the mobile app in layer 2 detects surround-
ing users through Bluetooth, recording the time interval ∆tB of
direct contact of the users, the random mac address MacAddr
of the other user, the type of mobile device DeviceType, and
the range of RSSI. The mobile app will packet these segments
into a transaction to broadcast in this blockchain network
and store in the blockchain database. And the mobile APP
will store all the Bluetooth mac addresses generated locally
for another service functionality health tracing, which will be
discussed in the next section.
Another scenario of Bluetooth-based contact tracing is that,
if the mobile APP receives a transaction containing other user’s
infected health status and his mac addresses, the Bluetooth-
based contact tracing will query its local blockchain database
based on these mac addresses, and check whether the current
user has a contact record with the infected user. If they have a
contact history, then the mobile APP will alert the user. Then,
the mobile APP will transfer and broadcast this transaction
again on the network to alert other users who may have a
contact history.
We have mentioned in the previous section that there are
two types of challenges: 1. The balance between the number of
random mac addresses generated by Bluetooth and protecting
users’ privacy, 2. The balance of the number of random mac
addresses and network congestion. For the first challenge, we
adopt the method of changing the silent period [25]. The
silent period refers to the gap time between Bluetooth device
discarding the old mac address and adopting the new mac
address [25], and during this period, the Bluetooth device
cannot decide to use the new or old address. The article points
out that changing the length of the silent period obviously
reduces the duration of the Bluetooth device being tracked,
and thus the device will not be located easily [25]. This is still
an open question, and it is worth our research in the future.
For the second challenge, we use weak randomization, which
reduces the number of random addresses generated, so fewer
transactions are generated for packing these mac addresses.
Then in the blockchain network, each computing node and
the user can achieve data consistency without synchronizing a
large number of communication requests.
D. Health Tracing
Health tracing is the third service in the proposed mobile
APP and it has two major functionalities: 1). Broadcast user’s
infection status to update contracts infection status and alert
other users. 2). Estimate the probability of being infected.
Within the first functionality, users can update their infection
status as Uinfected or Unormal. When the user’s status becomes
infected, the mobile APP will automatically two things: 1). up-
date all infection status among Contractlocations where this
user visited in the past 14 days based on his visiting records
and 2). broadcast transactions containing his infected status
and all the Bluetooth randomized mac addresses generated in
the past 14 days to alert others who have close contacts with
him.
Within the second functionality, users can estimate the
probability of being infected based on the analysis of the
four factors RSSI, ∆tB, ∆tC, ms. Referring to the formula (7)
in section 3, we believe these parameters and P(infection)
should be formalized in a logit function:
P(infection) =
1
1+ eβ0+β1RSSI⊗β2∆tB+β3∆tC⊗β4(ms)
(10)
Fig. 5: Average gas cost used for the system to process each
request.
where β4(ms) is formulized as
β4(ms) =

3 if ms = Aerosol
4 if ms = Copper
24 if ms = Cardboard
30 if ms = Other
48 if ms = StainlessSteel
72 if ms = Plastic
After accessing real medical data and investigating the public
locations, we will calculate and prove this proposed formula.
V. EVALUATION
We build a prototype system and evaluate its performance
with the following experiments, where we simulate users’
daily contact and check-in activities by the Poisson distribution
equation. In the experiments, we focus on the average cost
of processing requests and the total cost to operate our
prototype system. First, we introduce the environment for
the experiments. Then, we evaluate and analyze the system
performance on stability and scalability. In the future, we may
deploy our system and build benchmarks to evaluate when the
real dataset is available.
A. System Implementation
We conduct experiments on the MacBook Pro with a macOS
system in version 10.14.5. This machine has an Intel i5
CPU with 2.3 GHz and an 8 GB LPDDR3 memory. We
use a programming language called Solidity to develop and
implement the smart contract group, which are deployed on
a private Ethereum blockchain simulated by a software called
Ganache. Then, we use Python to code the script for data
analysis.
Our experiments focus on three basic variables affecting
performance: 1). The number of |U| increasing from 100 to
600, with even intervals of 100, 2). the user’s contact and
check-in frequency Freq following Poisson distribution, and
3). smart contract group size SCG.size.
Fig. 6: Standard deviation on average request cost for ten
rounds experiments.
Fig. 7: The total gas consumed by mobile services, smart
contracts and users.
B. Measure Avg Request Cost
Based on three quantities of deployed smart contracts and
six different numbers of requests increased from 100 to 600,
we measure the average gas cost of all requests, and the stan-
dard deviation on the average cost of ten rounds experiments.
Fig. 5 shows that as the quantity of contracts increases from
3 to 18, and the number of requests increases from 100 to 600,
the average request gas consumption is reduced by a factor
of 5 from 2,000,000 wei to 400,000 wei. Fig. 6 shows that
with the increase of requests, the deviation of request cost is
reduced by 5 times. Although the gas amount and deviation in
Fig. 5 and 6 are very large, the actual overhead is very small.
We know that wei is the smallest gas unit in Ethereum system
and 1 ether is equal to 1018 wei. Then, assuming 1 ether is
worth $250, an 400,000 wei request is worth $10−10, and the
deviation of 500 wei is negligible. Also, we find that in the
condition of different number of contracts, the average costs
trend to be a similar amount around 400,000 wei.
C. Evaluate System Overhead
System overhead refers to the interaction costs between
mobile services and users and operating costs for smart
contracts, which are measured by Ethereum gas.
Fig. 7 shows that when the number of requests increases
from 50 to 250, and the number of contracts increases from
3 to 18, the overall gas consumption of the system increases
linearly, considering the case of the same amount of requests
with different amount of contracts, and the case of the amount
of contracts with different amount of requests numbers.
Based on the three measurements, we believe that this
prototype system has good stability and scalability. With the
increase in the number of requests and contracts, the request
cost, which is the major overhead in the system operation, has
a stable approaching to a lower boundary. This trend supports
the stability of the system. Similarly, the system overhead
is linear growth, instead of an exponential one, which is an
acceptable performance.
VI. RELATED WORK
In the field of contact tracing, MIT [1], Apple and Google
[2] have related products and projects. However, their solutions
are either a centralized database that is built in the system
or incomplete privacy protection which is provided for users.
Such designs cannot meet the requirements of user privacy.
In terms of data security, the smart contract guarantees
the consistency of operating execution and then obtains a
consistent output. There is one paper presenting a computing
resource trading platform based on a smart contract-based
edge computing network [26]. This design uses a similar tree-
structured smart contract group with ours, but their implemen-
tation focuses on how to match users and complete resource
trading. And our purpose of smart contracts is to record the
infection status for locations.
Regarding privacy, there are articles that use differential
privacy algorithms in IoT data processing [27], but differential
privacy methods will return a relatively accurate output with
noise added. This conflicts with the property of blockchain
because when storing data, the latter block must verify the
correctness of the data of the previous block and cannot tol-
erate deviations. But it could be interesting to see intersection
research of these two fields.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design this tracing and notification system
based on blockchain and smart contract, which provides three
types of services: location-based contact tracing, Bluetooth-
based contact tracing and health tracing services. Our system
can trace the user’s travel and contact history, and can remind
the user about his past contacts that may cause infection.
In addition, users can also estimate the probability of being
infected through the health tracing service.
In order to protect users’ privacy, they can anonymously
send their visiting records and health status on the blockchain
platform. At the same time, users can use a large number of
random mac addresses provided by Bluetooth technology as
a temporary identity to further protect privacy. In addition,
our smart contract group embedded in the system records
the infection status of each location and performs the same
sequence of check-in operations to ensure that each user can
get the consistent infection results of the location.
We also simulate the interaction between users and our
prototype system, and then evaluate its performance, including
gas consumption, operating stability, and request processing
speed. In a simulated environment, our system has a good
scalability and good stability. We expect to have real data about
user contact records to evaluate our system in the future.
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